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How Social Objects (Fail to) Function
Frank Hindriks
Driver’s licenses and traffic lights make driving safer. And dollar bills and credit 
cards make exchanges more efficient as compared to bartering. Social objects can 
be useful in such ways because they have certain powers. Dollar bills have pur-
chasing power. And driver’s licenses restrict access to the public road to people 
that have them. But what purpose do social objects serve more generally? To an-
swer this question, I explore the role they play in social practices and institutions. 
Such social forms are patterns of behavior. Their function is to generate collective 
benefits. Social objects and the powers they have typically play an important role 
in this process.
According to the dual function theory that I propose here, social objects have 
two functions, a contributory function and a signaling function. Their contribu-
tory function is to facilitate or enable social forms to generate collective benefits. 
In order for them to contribute to this process, agents must exercise their social 
powers. But how do objects acquire such powers? Due to certain salient char-
acteristics. Such signals enable agents to converge on the same kind of object 
for similar purposes. Thus, the signaling function of social objects is to indicate 
mutually beneficial opportunities for interaction that involve those powers. In this 
sense, traffic lights signal when to stop and when to go.
After presenting this dual function theory, I use it to solve a puzzle that 
Seumas Miller (2001) and Barry Smith (2003) introduced almost two decades 
ago. Intuitively, the status of an object and its powers go together. For instance, 
in order for a piece of paper to be a dollar bill, it must be possible to use it as a 
means of exchange. However, a dollar bill can be so damaged that no one ac-
cepts it anymore. It appears that such “failing originals” have a status but not 
its concomitant powers (Almäng 2016). The reverse seems possible as well. A 
counterfeit dollar bill can look so real that one can use it to buy things with. This 
has been taken to mean that what I call “passing forgeries” have certain powers 
but not the associated status.
Cases such as these give rise to what I call “the mismatch problem,” which 
is the challenge of saving the intuition that statuses and powers stand or fall to-
gether.1  Barry Smith (2003) and Jan Almäng (2016) have argued that the intuition 
cannot be saved. Against this, I argue that their examples present only apparent 
mismatches. Thus, the intuition that statuses come with powers can be preserved. 
In Section 1, I present the dual function theory of social objects. I use it to solve 
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the mismatch problem in Section 2. I then go on, in Section 3, to compare it to 
John Searle’s (1995; 2010) status function theory. There I argue that the dual 
function theory is to be preferred to it because of its scope and explanatory power.
1. The Dual Function Theory
1.1. Signaling Functions and Contributory Functions
According to the dual function theory, social objects have functions. One 
of the functions of dollar bills, for instance, is to serve as a means of exchange. 
Such bills play important roles in the institution of money in the United States. 
An important function of the institution of money is to increase the efficiency of 
market transactions relative to barter economies. Dollar bills contribute to this 
by performing the function of a means of exchange. In this way, the function of 
the institution of money bears on the function that monetary objects have. A core 
claim of the dual function theory is that this holds more generally: social objects 
feature in social forms and the functions of the latter bear on the functions of the 
former. Social forms are defined by problems of social interaction, in particular 
coordination and cooperation problems. At the most abstract level, the function 
of a social form is to solve its defining problem and thereby generate collective 
benefits.2 
The participants of a social form contribute to this by exercising the powers 
of the social objects that feature in them. But what powers do social objects have? 
Social objects can be distinguished on the basis of whether they figure in social 
practices or in institutions. Social practices are patterns in behavior, such as driv-
ing on the left side of the road or using shells as money. And institutions are social 
practices that are governed by norms, such as marriage or property (Tuomela 
2013; Hindriks 2019). Social objects have causal powers, to wit dispositions to 
elicit behaviors. Institutional objects have deontic powers, which are rights or 
obligations. The function of a social form is to generate collective benefits by 
performing such causal or deontic powers.
As an example of a social object with causal powers, think of billboards 
along highways that indicate the presence of a restaurant at the next exit. They 
elicit certain behavior. More specifically, they trigger those who want to eat to 
take the next exist and eat something at the restaurant advertised. They thereby 
coordinate behaviors such that supply and demand meet. In principle, both pro-
ducers and consumers benefit. Examples of institutional objects include passports 
that permit people to travel abroad, and IDs that permit people to buy alcohol. 
Deontic powers are matched by causal powers at least to some extent. This means 
that they are effective and can be exercised. Because they have both kinds of 
powers, institutional objects are social objects, but not vice versa.
The first and main function of social objects is to contribute to the per-
formance of the functions of the social forms of which they are characteristic. 
Social objects facilitate and enable social forms to generate collective benefits. 
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They do so by means of the causal or deontic powers that they possess. This is 
their contributory function. Elsewhere I have argued that social forms feature 
social mechanisms (Hindriks 2017). Here the idea is that social objects form 
the nuts and bolts, or perhaps rather the cogs in such mechanisms. Cogs are 
supposed to facilitate or enable, or to contribute to the functioning of the mech-
anism of which they are part. Thus, they owe those powers in part to the social 
forms in which they figure, including in particular the attitudes that support 
them.3 
Social objects also have symbolic features that help people to figure out how 
to coordinate or cooperate in the context at issue. Wedding rings help married and 
unmarried people to coordinate by facilitating them to determine who are suit-
able targets for dating and mating. They signal who is available and who is not. 
Parking meters and signs indicate that drivers have to pay for parking their cars. 
They indicate or signal how to cooperate in this respect. Because of this, social 
objects can be seen as signaling devices. They signal mutually beneficial oppor-
tunities for interaction. This is their signaling function. Social objects perform 
this function by means of markers, which are salient properties of those objects 
(Haslanger 2000).4 
The function of the institution of money is to make exchanges more efficient 
as compared to bartering. Dollar bills contribute to this because they are a means 
of exchange, which means that they have purchasing power. This consists of the 
(second-order) right and ability to change the distribution of property rights. In 
the United States, the institution of money performs its function in part by people 
exercising this deontic power. But how do people know which objects to use as 
money? To this end, they rely on markers that enable them to converge on one 
and the same object. Think, for instance, of the widely known fact that the face of 
George Washington features on one-dollar bills.
Thus, the core of the dual function theory can be summarized in terms of a 
claim about the signaling function (SF) of social objects and their contributory 
function (CF):
(SF) The signaling function of social entities is to inform agents of how to coordinate or 
cooperate by means of their markers.
(CF) The contributory function of social entities is to enable coordination and cooperation 
by means of their powers.
A central insight of the dual function theory is that it is partly due to social 
objects, their powers and their markers that the interactions in which people en-
gage within social forms provide collective benefits.
1.2. Constitutive Rules
The dual function theory can be given more content in terms of the notion of 
a constitutive rule. Inspired by Amadeo Conte (1988), I take a constitutive rule to 
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consist of two rules, a status rule and a base rule (Hindriks 2013b). A status rule 
(SR) explicates a status (Y) in terms of its characteristic social powers (Z):
(SR) Y is Z
Thus, being Y is a matter of having the power to do Z. For instance, money is 
a means of exchange. As such, it provides the person who has it with purchasing 
power. In this case, the link between the status and its powers is in fact concep-
tual. This need not be the case, however. Consider the definition of “wedding 
ring” as “a ring worn by a married person, given to them by their spouse at their 
wedding” (Oxford Dictionary of English). This definition remains silent about its 
social powers.
Status objects depend on what I call “basic objects.” More specifically, they 
are constituted by basic objects of a type that is generally accepted to have a sta-
tus. This can be explicated in terms of a second kind of rule, a “base rule.” A base 
rule (BR) specifies the basic type of object that is constitutive of status object.5  It 
enumerates the basic conditions (X) that an object has to meet in order to have a 
status (Y) in the context at issue (C). Many objects, such as pieces of paper and 
golden rings, are especially created in order to constitute status objects. However, 
they do so only within the appropriate context:6 
(BR) X is Y in C
Thus, any object that is X in C has status Y and thereby is a status object. To 
be sure, a status term (Y) is nothing more than a label for a status that is specific 
to a particular context (C), such as “euro” for money in the Eurozone. However, 
this label stands for a set of powers (SR). Furthermore, the X-term specifies all the 
conditions that an object has to meet in order to have this status in that context. 
For instance, euro bills are made of cotton fiber, they feature a picture of a bridge 
on the back, have a portrait watermark and hologram, and they must have been is-
sued by the European Central Bank or a national central bank of the Eurosystem. 
Finally, together a BR and a SR form a dual constitutive rule.
So, how do base rules and status rules shed light on the two functions of 
social objects? The properties of basic objects are often instrumental to the con-
tributory functions of the status objects they constitute. According to economic 
theory, whatever is used as money should be durable, divisible, and transportable. 
Presumably, this explains why pieces of metal and paper have been popular as 
basic objects.7  A further instrumental property economists attribute to money is 
that it should be difficult to counterfeit. The underlying idea, in my terms, is that 
it is important for pieces of metal and paper to be the real thing in order for them 
to reliably perform their contributory function.
Wedding rings have a SF due to which they coordinate behaviors between 
married and unmarried people. They do so by indicating whether someone is mar-
ried. Due to a number of observable features, people recognize certain rings as 
wedding rings. They thereby indicate that a person wearing such a ring is married. 
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Because of the norms that are associated with such rings, they also serve a con-
tributory function. Unmarried people are not supposed to make advances to mar-
ried people, and vice versa. Married people benefit to the extent that they do not 
receive unwelcome advances. Unmarried people avoid embarrassing encounters 
and wasting time on those who are not available. Furthermore, weddings rings 
can help people not to give into temptation, which serves to stabilize marriages. 
In these ways, wedding rings help secure the collective benefits of marriage.
Both kinds of rules specify properties that are constitutive of status objects in 
different ways (Hindriks 2013a). Powers are, at least in many cases, constitutive 
of statuses in the conceptual sense. Basic properties are metaphysically necessary 
for an object having a status. In order for a dual constitutive rule to be in force, 
it has to be generally accepted.8  I use the term “type acceptance” for acceptance 
of a rule. The reason for this is that someone who accepts a BR thereby accepts a 
type of object that tokens thereof have the relevant status. People can also accept 
a token as having a status, as when a piece of paper is accepted as genuine after it 
has been checked by a counterfeit money detector.
Acceptance is a core determinant of how well social objects perform their 
contributory function. This can be illustrated in terms of an Italian proverb about 
traffic lights: in Milan, they are instructions; in Rome, they are suggestions; and in 
Naples, they are decorations. This suggests that they function properly in Milan, 
that they malfunction in Rome, and that they do not function at all in Naples. 
These differences in how they function can be explained at least partly in terms of 
the different attitudes that drivers in these cities have toward traffic lights, if not 
toward traffic rules more generally.
2. The Mismatch Problem
2.1. Statuses and Powers
The dual function theory of social objects is committed to what I call “the 
matching thesis” (MT):
(MT) An entity that has a particular status necessarily has the powers that are characteristic 
of that status.
In other words, statuses and powers stand or fall together. This follows immedi-
ately from the status rule, which equates statuses with powers; it has as its struc-
ture: Y is Z. In many cases, the two are equivalent by definition.
MT can be challenged in two ways. First, it might be possible for status ob-
jects to lack their concomitant powers. Second, objects might have powers with-
out the corresponding statuses. A damaged dollar bill that is not accepted as a 
means of payment is an example of the former; a counterfeit dollar bill that is 
accepted as the real thing is an example of the latter (Almäng 2016; Smith 2003). 
Consider also a valid ID that a bar tender mistakes for a fake one and a fake ID 
that is accepted as a valid one. In the introduction, I referred to these two kinds of 
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cases as “failing originals” and “passing forgeries.” Such cases have been taken to 
suggest that there can be double dissociations between statuses and powers. The 
mismatch problem is the challenge of accommodating alleged counterexamples 
in a way that preserves the matching thesis.
The examples just presented are incidental cases. However, a dissociation 
between statuses and powers can also be systematic. Smith (2003) imagines that 
Albania is flooded with fake U.S. dollar bills. The pieces of paper are accepted as 
dollar bills in Albania. However, they are counterfeit, “as would become clear im-
mediately were any of them to be presented for payment in an American bank” 
(Ibid., 293). It could also happen that originals fail on a systematic basis. Imagine, for 
instance, that at some point people in the U.S. stop accepting dollar bills altogether, 
perhaps due to hyperinflation. This raises the question whether they are still money.
Failing originals and passing forgeries also have been taken to present a chal-
lenge to the idea that status objects can be explicated in terms of constitutive 
rules. Smith presents his example as a challenge to John Searle’s (1995) claim 
that constitutive rules have as their structure “X counts as Y in C.” He claims 
that the pieces of paper are counted as money without being money. And he con-
cludes that constitutive rules cannot determine what money is. Almäng (2016) 
challenges my account of status rules, which explicate statuses in terms of pow-
ers. He regards the damaged dollar as a counterexample to this proposal: he takes 
it to have a status but not the concomitant power.9 
Some other examples concern social roles rather than objects. Just as social 
objects, social roles are individuated by their powers.10  Furthermore, someone 
who occupies a role has a certain status. Joshua Rust (2017) imagines the presi-
dency being stripped of its powers. If this were to happen, the claim is, someone 
would have the status of a president without having the relevant powers. Another 
example with the same structure is that of a police officer who is suspended. In a 
sense, these are examples of failing originals.
Miller (2001, 186) considers the role of being a surgeon, which involves a 
mix of deontic and causal powers. A licensed surgeon has the right to practice 
surgery. But successfully exercising this right requires skills, which are causal 
powers. Miller considers a licensed but incompetent surgeon—I will call him 
“Alex”—who is quite adept at hiding his lack of skills. In this respect, the exam-
ple resembles that of a passing counterfeit. Miller argues that, because he lacks 
the skills, Alex is not really a surgeon. This in spite of the fact that, legally, he is 
a surgeon. The underlying idea is that, when it comes to institutional roles such as 
being a surgeon, causal powers take priority over deontic powers.
I discuss social roles in Section 2.4. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, I discuss social 
objects: first incidental cases and then and systematic cases.
2.2. Social Objects: Incidental Cases
Two distinctions that are of vital importance for solving the mismatch 
problem are that between type and token acceptance and that between having 
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a social power and exercising it. The crucial point to appreciate, I propose, 
is that having a status along with its powers requires type acceptance, while 
exercising a power requires token acceptance. This is what I call “the power 
thesis” (PT):
(PT) Type acceptance is necessary for having a status and its powers; token acceptance is 
necessary only for exercising powers.
In order for objects of some kind to have a particular status, the participants in a 
social practice have to accept that such objects have that status. As discussed in 
Section 2, such type acceptance is a matter of them generally accepting the rele-
vant base rule. In addition to this, exercising the powers of a status object requires 
token acceptance: the particular object that has the status must be accepted as 
having it in the context in which its power is exercised. A passport enables you 
to travel abroad, for instance, only when it is accepted as valid by the customs 
officer.11 
The power thesis helps to understand why originals can fail. The mismatch 
problem assumes that objects that cannot be used for exercising certain powers 
do not have them. But in the examples presented, the objects do have the relevant 
status. Hence, they are taken to reveal that powers can come apart from statuses. 
The thing to appreciate, however, is that the assumption is mistaken: it does not 
follow from the fact that certain powers cannot be exercised that the objects do 
not have them. Originals fail due to a lack of token acceptance. But they still 
have their status along with its powers due to type acceptance. The power thesis 
supports both of these claims.
Consider a 21-year-old American student who wants to buy a beer in a bar. 
The bartender does not accept his ID as valid, even though it is. It is valid due to 
type acceptance: it is generally accepted that X is Y in C, and the card is of type 
X. What is lacking is token acceptance. The bartender does not acknowledge that 
the card is of type X. Because of this, the ID does not suitably signal the student’s 
status, which means that he cannot exercise its powers and buy a beer. It does not 
follow, however, to conclude that the ID card has lost its powers. Bartenders in 
other bars will in all likelihood accept it. Thus, the status and its powers do not 
come apart, which means that there is no genuine mismatch.
Passing forgeries, such as a fake ID that passes as a valid one, present more 
of a challenge. Suppose that a 21-year-old student uses it to buy a beer. It might 
seem that, because the object is used for this purpose, having the relevant power 
can come apart from having the status. However, the object does not really have 
the relevant power. Instead, it appears that way. And, because of this, the token 
is accepted as having a status that it does not have. Furthermore, it is used as if it 
has the power. In other words, it mimics it. This can be captured by modifying the 
power thesis as follows (PT*):
(PT*) Type acceptance is necessary for having a status and its powers; token acceptance 
is necessary only for exercising powers and sometimes sufficient for mimicking powers.
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What passing forgeries reveal is that, at least some of the time, token acceptance 
enables people to use an object for some purpose. This in spite of the fact that 
other objects are supposed to be used for that purpose.
This third part of the power thesis should be understood against the back-
ground of a social form in which a BR is generally accepted. In the example just 
used, this means that there is a BR in place for IDs. And it may well be that there 
are plenty of cards (Xs) that are valid IDs (Ys). However, the token at issue is a 
fake (not X). Hence, it does not have the relevant status (not Y). Even so, it is 
accepted as having the status. More precisely, it is mistaken for an object meets 
the relevant conditions and therefore accepted as if it has the status. One question 
is how this can happen. As discussed above, people rely on markers in order to 
recognize an object as having a status. And markers and people are not perfectly 
reliable. The further question is why forgeries are sometimes successful. How can 
objects without a status sometimes mimic the powers of that status?
The first thing to note is that actually doing something does not entail having 
the power to do so (Dowding and Van Hees 2008). In other words, sometimes 
agents can do things they lack the power to do. Think of an average-sized man 
who would normally fail were he to try to lift a car. However, when his wife is 
trapped under a car, he does succeed to lift it and save her. In a sense, his doing 
so is a fluke. It is due to extraordinary circumstances. Because he would normally 
fail, it is appropriate to say that he lacks the power to perform an action he just 
performed. Thus, he mimics the power in the sense that he does something that 
would normally require a power he does not have.
This argument presents a problem for the proponents of the mismatch prob-
lem. They rely on the mistaken inference from an object doing something to it 
having the power to do so. Yet, it does not provide a complete response. The fact 
that the student with the fake ID is served a beer might indeed be a fluke. As such, 
it need not reflect a power of his or his card. However, this does not explain why 
it can be used in this way. Furthermore, this line of argument does not generalize 
from incidental cases to the systematic cases that I go on to discuss next. All I can 
conclude at this point is that, strikingly, it sometimes suffices for a forgery to be 
used as if it were the real thing that the particular object, the token, is mistakenly 
accepted as having the status.
2.3. Social Objects: Systematic Cases
An object can also fail or pass on a systematic basis, across a wide range of 
circumstances. Almäng (2016) considers a real but damaged dollar bill that is 
treated as a forgery everywhere. Similarly, a fake dollar might pass in all circum-
stances. Smith’s (2003) Albania example is general in another respect: Albania 
is flooded with fake dollar bills that are accepted as valid throughout the country. 
It could also happen that U.S. Americans stop using dollar bills altogether even 
though they are still valid. As I discuss below, the number of objects that pass 
or fail makes a difference to how tempting it is to regard them as the real thing.
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The damaged dollar bill is an example of a failing original. This suggests that 
it can be accounted for in terms of a lack of token acceptance (PT*). The example 
differs in one respect from the valid ID example discussed in Section 2.2. The 
ID is refused on a single occasion by a single bartender. The damaged dollar is 
rejected across circumstances. Hence, rather than incidental, the lack of token 
acceptance is systematic in this case. Even so, those who treat the damaged dollar 
as a forgery are simply mistaken. It is a valid dollar bill, “as would become clear 
immediately were it presented to an American bank.”12  Because of this, it has the 
same purchasing power as any other. However, it cannot be used as a means of 
exchange in practice because of how people respond to the fact that it is damaged.
Almäng (2016) cannot accept this diagnosis. He believes that having a status 
along with its powers requires not only type acceptance, but also token accep-
tance. This means that he rejects the first part of the power thesis (PT).13  Almång 
infers from the fact that the dollar bill cannot be used as a means of payment that 
it does not have its powers. However, this does not follow. It might be that, be-
cause the circumstances are extraordinary, the powers of the object are masked. 
Just as doing something does not entail having the power to do it, failing to do 
something does not imply a lack of power (the ability or power of a pianist with 
stage fright is masked when on stage). To be sure, the object is in some sense 
defective. However, a bank would exchange it for an undamaged dollar bill. This 
reveals that it has not lost its powers altogether.
Smith’s (2003) Albania example concerns passing forgeries. He presents the 
example as a challenge to the role of acceptance in relation to constitutive rules. 
This can be defused by invoking the distinction between type and token accep-
tance. Type acceptance, or acceptance of a base rule, is what determines whether 
an object is genuine or fake (PT). This claim is not undermined by the fact that 
token acceptance sometimes enables people to use a forgery as if it were the real 
thing. But the question remains how to explain why the forgeries pass for the real 
thing. Each of them is mistakenly accepted as having the status. In Section 2.2, 
I proposed that this explains why these objects mimic its powers (PT*). When this 
is a fluke, this is perhaps not so surprising. But how can it occur on a systematic 
basis?
This can be explained in terms of the distinction between causal and deontic 
powers. In order for deontic powers to be effective, they have to be matched by 
causal powers. No beer has been sold if the beer does not actually change hands. 
However, causal powers can exist independently of deontic powers. It is perfectly 
well possible to hand over a beer without making a sale. Now, the transfers that 
take place using fake dollar bills are observationally indistinguishable from genu-
ine market exchanges. And the causal processes are identical. However, because 
the dollar bills are forgeries, no legitimate market exchanges have taken place. 
Thus, I propose that deontic powers can be mimicked in that only the correspond-
ing causal powers are exercised.
Strikingly, all alleged counterexamples concern institutional statuses, which 
are defined in terms of deontic powers. This allows for the possibility that the 
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relevant objects have the causal powers but not the deontic powers. They lack the 
deontic powers because they do not belong to the type of object that is accepted 
as having them. They possess the causal powers because they are mistaken for 
status objects. Even though the causal process is the same, it cannot adequately be 
described in institutional terms, because the pieces of paper do not have the status 
and the concomitant deontic powers. In light of this, passing forgeries do not pose 
a problem for the matching thesis: the forged dollar bills lack both the statuses 
and the deontic powers. Thus, there is no mismatch.
However, the longer this practice of using the forgeries as an apparent means 
of exchange exists, the more difficult it becomes to deny that the pieces of paper 
are money, or so it seems. Whether or not this is the case, however, it should 
be clear that they will not be U.S. dollar bills. They are not Xs, if only because 
they have not been issued by the Federal Reserve. Hence, they are not Ys. Now, 
suppose that years later the Albanians discover that the dollar bills that are in cir-
culation are forgeries. How would they respond? One option would be that they 
cease to use the dollar bills. The other option is that they do not care and keep on 
using them. If that is what happens, the Albanians in effect adopt a BR according 
to which certain fake dollars are money. And at that point, and not earlier, do the 
fake dollars become real money. They would become a kind of ersatz money 
similar to the cigarettes Allied prisoners of war used as money in World War II. 
In this way, forgeries can be so successful that they acquire a new status.
Thus, even though the systematic cases pose a bigger challenge to the match-
ing thesis than the incidental ones, the diagnosis is ultimately the same. Tokens 
acceptance can be out of sync with type acceptance, whether incidentally or on a 
systematic basis. Hence, the matching thesis survives these counterexamples as 
well.
2.4. Social Roles
The final challenge concerns social roles. As discussed in Section 2.1, some-
one who occupies a role has a certain status, which consists of one or more pow-
ers. Think, for instance, of the power of the U.S. president to veto certain laws, or 
of that of a teacher to give a pupil detention for throwing a temper tantrum. Social 
roles resemble social objects in other respects as well. In order to have a status, a 
person has to meet the conditions that feature in a base rule.14  Furthermore, that 
BR has to be generally accepted in order to be in force (type acceptance). When 
that is the case, any person who meets the basic conditions has the relevant status 
along with its powers. Because of these parallels, “originals” can also fail, and 
“forgeries” can also pass. And they can be dealt with as before.
It has been argued, however, that social roles give rise to new, different 
counterexamples to the matching thesis. The first one concerns people who have 
statuses without powers. Rust (2017) imagines that the presidency be stripped 
of its powers. This implies that the president plays a merely ceremonial role (as 
in Germany). It also means that the mismatch problem does not arise. After all, 
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there are no powers associated with a status. It is informative to compare this case 
to one in which someone has been temporarily stripped of his powers, such as a 
suspended police officer. The thing to see is that their status is diminished to the 
exact same extent as their powers. This means that the (reduced) powers in fact 
match the (diminished) status. The term “suspended” marks the fact that they are 
not ordinary police officers. They have what I propose to call “a truncated status.”
The second counterexample concerns the skills required for fulfilling roles. 
Recall Alex, the incompetent surgeon. Miller (2001, 186) claims that Alex is not 
a surgeon because he lacks the requisite skills. This in spite of the fact that he 
acknowledges that Alex does have the corresponding legal powers. Interpreted 
as the claim that Alex seems to have the status without the concomitant causal 
powers, this presents a challenge to the matching thesis (MT). However, the status 
of a surgeon is an institutional status. As such, it is defined in terms of deontic 
powers. A surgeon is a licensed doctor who is thereby legally qualified to perform 
medical operations. This means that, given that Alex has the deontic powers, he 
is a surgeon. So, there is no mismatch after all. Pace Miller, deontic powers take 
priority over causal powers.
Social statuses, in contrast, stand or fall together with their causal powers. 
Consider Alexia, who has the skills to cure people. She has become the go-to 
person for people who fall ill in her community. As in this community there are 
no licenses for curing people, she does not have any of the deontic powers that 
Alex has. However, she does have the relevant skills. Furthermore, she gets to 
exercise them within the context of a social practice. This is due to the fact that 
it is generally accepted that people who are like her in relevant respects have the 
corresponding causal powers. Now, if Alexia loses her skills, she ceases to be a 
doctor. And, by the matching thesis, if she loses the powers, then she loses the sta-
tus. This means that Miller’s intuition holds for social rather than for institutional 
roles. Even so, it still does not undermine the matching thesis.
But why are there institutional roles, in addition to social ones? To an import-
ant extent, this is to determine who gets to engage in which activities and to thereby 
secure that those who do have the requisite skills. Access to institutional roles is 
limited by degrees and licenses. These in turn are markers of or proxies for skills.15  
They can be seen as signaling devices that serve to coordinate behaviors between 
those who offer a particular service and those who are looking for it. And they 
thereby enable people to engage in transactions that are not just based on scarcity 
but also on the basis of quality. This reveals that, just as social objects, social roles 
have signaling and contributory functions. It follows that, in addition to accep-
tance, the functioning of an institution depends also on skills. In this way, this ex-
ploration of social roles enriches understanding of the functioning of social forms.
Thus, the dual function theory solves the mismatch problem in all of its 
guises. It does so in terms of the distinction between type- and token-acceptance 
on the one hand, and the distinction between having and exercising a power on the 
other hand. A failing original falls under the BR that is in force (type acceptance). 
As such, it has the relevant status along with its concomitant powers. However, 
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it cannot exercise those powers because it is not accepted as having the status (no 
token acceptance). In contrast, a passing forgery does not fall under a base rule, 
which means that it has neither status nor powers (no type acceptance). However, 
it can do the same thing as a status entity, on occasion or over a wide range of 
circumstances. Because it is accepted as having the status, it mimics its powers.
3. The Status Function Theory
The mismatch problem arose as a challenge to Searle’s (1995) social ontol-
ogy (Miller 2001; Smith 2003). I have argued that the dual function theory (DFT) 
solves it due to its commitment to the matching thesis (MT):
(MT) An entity that has a particular status has the powers that are characteristic of that 
status.
Searle’s theory revolves around the notion of a status function. A status consists 
of deontic powers. And a status function is performed by exercising its deontic 
powers. I refer to it as “the status function theory.” This theory supports the fol-
lowing thesis about the relation between statuses and powers (MT*):
(MT*) Status functions are necessarily connected with deontic powers.
This thesis follows directly from Searle’s claim that “there is an essential con-
nection between status function and deontic power” (2008, 31). MT* differs from 
MT in that it does not carry a commitment to entities that have social properties. 
Searle is an anti-realist about the social. As such, he is committed only to social 
and institutional facts.16  Two other differences are that, whereas MT features the 
terms “status” and “power”, MT* uses instead the terms “status function” and 
“deontic power.” Although these two differences may appear small, they will turn 
out to have significant consequences.
In response to Smith’s (2003) Albanian dollars example, Searle (2003) claims 
that there are criteria for counting something as a dollar that “should prevail over 
the actual practices in question” (Searle 2003, 301). This is in line with the solu-
tion that I have proposed above. The idea would be that the actual practices in 
which the forgeries circulate are based on token acceptances, and that the criteria 
are, in my terms, the basic conditions of a base rule, which pertains to the type. 
Although Searle does not, as far as I know, draw a distinction between having a 
power and exercising it, he does not exclude it either. Hence, SFT is consistent 
with the power thesis according to which having a power requires type accep-
tance, while exercising a power requires token acceptance. It follows that Searle, 
or any other proponent of SFT, can adopt the solutions that I have proposed to the 
mismatch problem.
In spite of this, there is ample reason to prefer DFT to SFT. First, the scope 
of Searle’s theory is relatively small, because it is restricted to a particular kind 
of deontic power. Because of this, it excludes objects and roles that consist only 
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of causal powers, such as billboards and doctors such as Alexia.17  Furthermore, 
as Searle (1995, 2010) uses the term, only prescriptions, prohibitions and permis-
sions are deontic powers. As a consequence, SFT excludes second-order deontic 
powers such as Hohfeldian powers and immunities. These are rights that en-
able an agent to change first-order rights and obligations (Wenar 2015). For in-
stance, a CEO has the right to fire people and thereby take away their privileges. 
Similarly, a judge has the power to silence someone in court. Strikingly, Searle’s 
favorite example, money, also requires a broader conception of deontic powers 
than the one he relies on, as it consists of the ability to change the distribution 
of property rights. Hence, SFT also excludes some of the more complex and 
important institutional objects and roles. This means that its scope—and thereby 
the scope of its solution to the mismatch problem—is substantially smaller than 
that of DFT.
The second problem concerns the notion of a status function. It suggests that 
SFT does not allow statuses and functions to come apart. This is problematic, 
because statuses come with powers and functions and powers can come apart. To 
be sure, an entity performs a function by exercising one of its powers. However, 
it can do the latter without achieving the former. For instance, humans procre-
ate by having sex, but they can have sex without procreating. Similarly, health- 
promoting surgeries are performed by licensed surgeons, but licensed surgeons 
can perform surgeries without promoting health. Thus, the relation between func-
tions and the powers by means of which they are performed is contingent. What 
I call “the match problem” is this: even though they can come apart in practice, 
functions and powers necessarily match in theory. That SFT suffers from this 
problem follows immediately from MT*, according to which the relation between 
the two is necessary. Given that they can come apart, MT* must be mistaken. The 
upshot is that, although the relation between statuses and powers is necessary, the 
relation between powers and functions is not.
Searle (1995, 16) relies on a teleological conception of a function, accord-
ing to which to impose a function to an entity is to assign a purpose to it. The 
function or purpose of a status is for its deontic powers to be exercised. Recall 
that an entity performs its function by exercising its powers. This implies that a 
status function is performed by exercising its deontic powers. However, given 
that its function is for its deontic powers to be exercised, it also follows that, by 
exercising its deontic powers, the status function is performed. This is why SFT 
succumbs to the match problem. There is a double association between functions 
and powers.
The match problem is not inherent to the teleological concept of a function. 
Suppose that the purpose of a status is to realize some value. It might be that its 
powers are exercised without this value materializing. This would mean that the 
status function is not performed. Thus, the match problem can be solved by in-
troducing an account of the values that are realized by exercising deontic powers. 
However, SFT does not feature such an account. The problem can be avoided 
altogether by adopting a causal or etiological concept of function, as DFT does. 
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In Section 1.1, I proposed that the function of social practices and institutions is 
to generate collective benefits. This is their etiological function. This means that 
the fact that a social form performs a particular function explains both why it is 
there and why it persists (Wright 1973; Millikan 1993).
Objects and agents can play a CF with respect to social forms in that they 
facilitate or enable them to perform their function. This means that they play 
a role in the social mechanism that constitutes the social form. A dissocia-
tion between the function of an entity and its powers is possible because the 
relation between them is a causal one. It is invariant over some but not all 
circumstances. As such, it allows for exceptions. In particular, it allows for 
the possibility that the powers of an object are exercised, but that its CF is 
not performed. This means that, in cases in which they are, DFT can provide 
a genuine explanation of how social entities contribute to the existence and 
persistence of social forms. Thus, DFT possesses a kind of explanatory power 
that SFT lacks.18 
The upshot is that DFT is to be preferred over SFT. First, DFT provides for 
a solution to the mismatch problem that is more general than that of SFT. And 
second, DFT has more explanatory power than SFT such that it does not suffer 
from the match problem.19 
4. Conclusion
The function of social practices and institutions is to generate collective ben-
efits. I have argued that this claim sheds light on the nature of social objects and 
roles. According to the dual function theory presented here, social entities have 
themselves two functions. The CF of social objects and roles is to facilitate or 
enable this by means of their social powers. Their SF is to indicate mutually 
beneficial opportunities for interaction that involve such objects and roles. I have 
defended the theory further by arguing that it solves the mismatch problem, the 
challenge that statuses and powers can come apart. Sometimes the power of a 
status is masked (failing originals). In other cases, an entity that does not have the 
status mimics the power (passing forgeries).
Thus, the dual function theory supports the matching thesis according to 
which statuses necessarily come with powers. Its main rival, the status function 
theory, maintains that statuses and their powers are also necessarily related to 
functions. Against this, I have argued that the relation between powers and 
functions is contingent. Even though functions are performed by exercising 
powers, it is possible for a power to be exercised while the function is not per-
formed. Licenses for surgeons are meant to promote health. Even so, licensed 
surgeons can perform surgeries without achieving this. In light of this, I have 
argued that the relation between powers and functions is causal. The upshot is 
that statuses and powers always go together, while powers and functions can 
come apart.
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Notes
1I take the term “mismatch problem” from Mallon (2017) who uses it for a different problem, which 
concerns the fact that some social constructs involve widespread false beliefs. He argues that this 
poses a problem for referring to them, if not for their very existence.
2See Schotter (1981, 22 and 44), Tuomela (2007; 2013, 229) and Hindriks and Guala (2019). Section 3 
discusses the notion of a function.
3Contributory functions are akin to Cummins’ (1975) role functions (see also Craver 2001).
4In coordination games, social objects are signaling devices in a more technical sense: they correlate 
and coordinate behaviors in mutually beneficial ways. As such, they give rise to what is known 
as “correlated equilibria” and are also known as “correlating devices” (Aumann 1974; 1987; 
Vanderschraaf 1995; Gintis 2007). Correlating devices also create novel opportunities for coor-
dination (Tuomela 2013; Guala and Hindriks 2015; Hindriks and Guala 2015).
5Searle’s (1995; 2010) account of constitutive rules only features analogues of base rules. Snare’s 
(1972) explication of the institution of property in terms of its constitutive rules makes abundant-
ly clear that this will not do, as property necessarily involves a number of rights, in particular the 
right of use, exclusion and transfer.
6An entity can be a basic entity relative to an institutional entity, even though it is itself an institutional 
entity. Thus, objects X are more basic than status objects Y in that the former (metaphysically) 
constitute the latter. However, they can themselves be institutional objects Y* constituted by 
more basic objects X*. In this respect, it resembles Anscombe’s (1958, 71) use of the term “brute 
fact.”
7There are, however, striking exceptions to this. Objects that have been used as money range from 
cigarettes to large circular stone disks carved out of limestone (Welch and Welch 2010). The 
former are not durable, and the latter are not divisible and transportable.
8In fact, it often suffices if its BR is generally accepted. When a SR explicates the status concept, as in 
the case of money, people who accept the BR of a currency are thereby committed to regarding 
it as a means of exchange. When this is not hold, as in the case of a wedding ring, the SR has to 
be accepted separately.
9Almäng (2016) targets the account as presented in Hindriks (2012). There, I propose that status rules 
can be viewed as definitions of status terms. This should be seen as a theoretical proposal that 
does not always match dictionary definitions (see Section 1.2).
10According to functional role theory, social roles are shared normative expectations that prescribe 
and explain behavior (Biddle 1986). Although this theory is not current anymore, this core idea 
is still influential in sociology and social psychology. The notion of generally accepted deontic 
powers is rather similar to that of shared normative expectations.
11When formal institutions are involved, type acceptance is indirect. People generally accept the au-
thority of an organization that settles the conditions that a status object has to meet, such as a 
central bank.
12As mentioned in Section 2.1, Smith (2003, 293) uses a similar phrase in connection to forged dollar 
bills.
13Almäng (2016) relies on a distinction that is analogous to type and token acceptance: de dicto versus 
de re representations. In line with what I have proposed above, he maintains that “the fact that an 
object has a certain institutional status normally depends upon representations de dicto” (Almäng 
2016, 9). In addition to this, however, he claims that facts about deontic powers and institutional 
functions also depend on de re representations. This entails that status entities do not have powers 
or functions in the absence of de re representations.
14In support of this claim, I argue elsewhere that constitution need not be a relation between objects, 
but can also be a relation between properties (Hindriks 2012; 2013a).
15Whereas the markers of social objects are usually observable basic properties, the markers of social 
roles are rarely observable characteristics of the people who occupy them. Instead, invisible roles 
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are often made visible by means of objects associated to them. Think of mayoral chains or of the 
white coats that nurses and doctors wear in hospitals.
16Searle is most explicit about this in a recent paper entitled “Are There Social Objects?” The answer 
turns out to be a resounding “no” (Searle 2014). See Baker (2019) for a critical discussion of 
Searle’s anti-realism.
17Searle (1995) distinguishes between social and institutional facts. However, social facts involve in-
tentional states that are irreducibly collective. As such, they pertain, for instance, to people acting 
together. They do not concern social statuses that come with causal powers.
18A further difference is that DFT is partly based on an equilibrium account of social practices and 
institutions, which SFT rejects. When commenting on Hindriks and Guala (2015), Searle claims 
that the contribution of equilibrium accounts “to the theory of institutional ontology is zero, 
nothing” (2015, 513).
19This discussion of the match problem provides further support for my earlier claim that SFT would 
be better off without the notion of a function (Hindriks 2013b). See Hindriks and Guala (2019) 
for an alternative framework that combines an etiological with a teleological perspective.
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